draft

TABLE OF CITATIONS iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION vi

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1

I. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY MAKING A LAWYER NECESSARY FOR CONTINUATION OF THE FCA CASE, WHEN THE UNITED STATES HAD DECLINED TO INTERVENE?

II. WHETHER THE COURT'S DECISIONS DENIED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS BY CLOSING THE CASE WITH FINALITY WHEN NO COUNSEL COULD BE FOUND ; BY NOT ALLOWING HER TO PROCEED PRO SE?

III. WHETHER UNUSUAL PROCEDURES COMPLICATED

RELATOR'S PRESENTATIONS AND PREJUDICED HER CASE ?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2

I. THE NATURE OF THE CASE

II. THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6

ARGUMENT/ CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY 9

I. THE COURT ERRED BY MAKING A LAWYER NECESSARY FOR CONTINUATION OF THE FCA CASE, WHEN THE UNITED STATES HAD DECLINED TO INTERVENEII. THE COURT'S DECISIONS DENIED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS BY CLOSING THE CASE WITH FINALITY WHEN NO COUNSEL COULD BE FOUND ; BY NOT ALLOWING HER TO PROCEED PRO SE 9

II. THE COURT'S DECISIONS DENIED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS BY CLOSING THE CASE WITH FINALITY WHEN NO COUNSEL COULD BE FOUND ; BY NOT ALLOWING HER TO PROCEED PRO SE 11

III. THE UNUSUAL PROCEDURES COMPLICATED

RELATOR'S PRESENTATIONS AND PREJUDICED HER CASE 13

REFERENCE TO PARTIES 18

REFERENCES TO RECORDS 18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 19

Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1984) vii

Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co.,

331 U.S. 519, 524-25, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 1390, 91 L.Ed. 1646 (1947) ix

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) vii

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102,

2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) 10

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,

98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) viii

Csx Transp. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325

(11th Cir. 2000), No. 99-12799 vii

DEVINE v. INDIAN RIVER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 121 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 1997) ix, x

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525 9

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981) viii

Gardener v. Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U.S. 167, 172 (1967) 10

Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1949) vii

J.B. STRINGFELLOW, JR., ET AL., PETITIONERS V. CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION, ET AL. No. 85-184 18

Jetco Electronic Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner,

473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.1973) vii

Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481 (11 Cir. 1992),

cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987 (1993) 10

O'Reilly v. New York Times, 692 F.2d 863 (2nd Cir. 1982) 2, 6, 9, viii

Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408 (2 Cir. 1976) 9

RESHARD v. BRITT, 819 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1987) 2, 6, 7, 9, ix

Roberts v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal.,

339 U.S. 844, 70 S.Ct. 954, 955, 94 L.Ed. 1326 (1950) 2, ix

Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 1978) sj

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 10, vii

United States cx. rel. Trice v. Westinghouse Hansford Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8838(E.D. ash.Mar. 2000) 10, 11

United States ex rel. Kelly v. The Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743(9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140, 127 L. Ed. 2d 433, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994) 10, 11

Vermont Agency of Nat. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765(2000) 7, 10, 12

Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1984)

CONSTITUTION, RULES, STATUTES

Amend XIV, Section 1, U.S. Constitution

Local Rule 2.01(a) 8, 10, viii

Local Rule 3.01(a) 4, 15

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(1)(B) viii

Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) 10, 15

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) 9, 15

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) 4

Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a) 9

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) vi

28 U.S.C. § 1291 vi

28 U.S.C. § 1654 7, 9, vi

31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (False Claims Act) 12

31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) 14

31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) 7, 14

31 U.S.C. §3730(d)(4) 12

31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (False Claims Act) 12

MIDDLE DISTRICT DISCOVERY (2001) at I.E.4 17

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This action is brought in a pro se capacity, in Federal Court, under § 1654 of 28 U.S.C. and should be immediately appealable pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral order doctrine. Additionally this court has jurisdiction to hear all appeals from final dismissal of complaints from district courts. On May 8th, 2003, this court asked Appellant to explain that her case " is a final and appealable decision." On May 16th her statement was filed with the court. [Please refer to this document for details]. In this statement Appellant explained that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 did apply since the district court dismissed the case [closed the case] by refusing to let her continue litigation without a lawyer and no lawyer was found by the arbitrary date set by the Court of April 1st, 2003.

Both Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) and Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1984) did not apply to her case since there had been no type of judgment.

There had been only a series of orders, which effectively prevent Stronstorff from litigating her False Claims Act [FCA] suit. The order of February 13, 2002 [Doc 40] combined with the following orders on March 17th [Doc 43] and April 14th [Doc 45] and events [ The Relator was unable to obtain a lawyer within the time limit set by the court [last date April 1st, 2003].] effectively ended the litigation of her case with finality. vi

Recognized exceptions to the finality rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 using the series of orders are stated in Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 1978) and Jetco Electronic Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1973) and Csx Transp. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2000), No. 99-12799. In Jetco the court cited Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1949), that "practical, not technical considerations are to govern the application of principles of finality.

The appeal was filed timely with the exhaustion of all possibilities given by the district court to continue her litigation. The finality required to be reviewed by this Court occurred only with the denial of her motion for reconsideration on April 13th. Only at this time did the series of three orders dismiss her case with finality and fall under the "collateral order" doctrine adopted by the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).

In the meantime, BMC states that the first order was not an appealable order because of the remaining party: IHS. However, the denial of continuing an FCA claim as was done on April 13th would preclude litigation by the Relator against IHS as well as against BMC or any other party. The Court decided that she could not continue without a lawyer and April 1st, 2003 was the last day given to reopen the FCA case. This last order of April 13th made the first order appealable as a vii

final order, since this order barred any further action in this FCA case whatsoever without a lawyer. It denied her, her right to self-representation in federal court. The order denying the reconsideration of the February 13th order irreparably harms the Relator. All motions and the appeal of the series of orders were timely. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(1)(B) gives Relator 60 days to appeal since the United States is a party, and not 30 as BMC portrays.

In Doc 46 Counsel for BMC stated that Relator misunderstood the dismissal. Relator understood that only BMC's cited court cases were being used by the Court and hers were being omitted other than to point out her "enigmatic" overuse of the "motion for clarification ."

The entire FCA claim was dismissed on April 14, 2003 with the refusal to reconsider allowing Relator to proceed "pro se" in the absence of a lawyer. This bars all avenues of litigating her complaint and is therefore appealable and the appeal is timely. There is no reason to believe that IHS would not be granted the same benefit of Local Rule 2.01(a) in this case, as well as all other parties.

The collateral order doctrine as cited in paragraph 7 of

O'Reilly v. New York Times, 692 F.2d 863 (2nd Cir. 1982) fits this appeal. It mentions Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978) and Firestone

Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981)

"Under this test an order comes within the Cohen doctrine if it "conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the case, and [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."."

It appears that Stronstorff could have filed an interlocutory appeal on the February 13, 2003 order [Doc 40]. See RESHARD v. BRITT, 819 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1987). Yet at this time the order had not caused irreparable harm. It was in no case a final order, since it was without prejudice and time was given until March 11 to reopen the action. The issues of the FCA case and the issue of self-representation are two separate issues, which must be decided now and cannot wait a "final order."

"An order denying self-representation is analogous to other orders courts have found immediately appealable."

DEVINE v. INDIAN RIVER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 121 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 1997), n. 7. See Roberts v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 339 U.S. 844, 70 S.Ct. 954, 955, 94 L.Ed. 1326 (1950); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 524-25, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 1390, 91 L.Ed. 1646 (1947).

The district court's orders are effectively unreviewable on appeal from

final judgment and, therefore, should give jurisdiction over this appeal now.

"The collateral order doctrine permits immediate appellate review of a trial court order only when strict observance of the final judgment rule "would render impossible any review whatsoever" (United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971)) or "'would practically defeat the right to any review at all'" (Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 265 (citation omitted)). The doctrine has therefore been limited to "trial court orders affecting rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal" (Richardson-Merrell, slip op. 6). See also Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. at 266; United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978). [fn4]

See DEVINE v. INDIAN RIVER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 121 F.3d 576

[10]..."The harm in erroneously denying a party leave to proceed pro se is that it injures his/her dignity and autonomy, and this harm cannot be repaired after a judgment on the merits."

I. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY MAKING A LAWYER NECESSARY FOR CONTINUATION OF THE FCA CASE, WHEN THE UNITED STATES HAD DECLINED TO INTERVENE?

III. WHETHER UNUSUAL PROCEDURES COMPLICATED

RELATOR'S PRESENTATIONS AND PREJUDICED HER CASE ?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. THE NATURE OF THE CASE.

This is an appeal concerning a False Claims Act complaint filed by a pro se Relator on April 30th, 2001. This is an appeal from a series of Non-Final Orders executed and filed on April 28, 2003 with the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, TAMPA DIVISION [Doc 50]. The orders appealed were filed on February 14, 2003, March 17, 2003 and April 14,2003. [Doc 40, Doc 43 and Doc 45]. Taken together, these orders have terminated Relator's possibility of litigating her FCA complaint with finality, since no lawyer could be found to continue the litigation as ordered by the court. By April 1st, 2003 no lawyer to reopen the case was found and the court denied her the right to proceed pro se on April 14th. An order denying self-representation is analogous to other orders courts have found immediately appealable. See RESHARD v. BRITT, 819 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1987), O'Reilly v. New York Times, 692 F.2d 863 (2nd Cir. 1982), Roberts v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 339 U.S. 844, 70 S.Ct. 954, 955, 94 L.Ed. 1326 (1950).

Relator's right of appeal appears unquestionable, however, it could be that it should be classified as an appeal interlocutory instead of final, yet the prongs of the Cohen collateral order appear to be met, since there will be no final order to review with the current state caused by the denial of Stronstorff's Motion for reconsideration on April 14, 2003.

II. THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

On April 30, 2001, the relator, proceeding pro se, filed a qui tam complaint for violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, et seq., against Blake Medical Center (BMC) and Integrated Health Services of Bradenton (IHS). On February 19, 2002, the United States declined to intervene (Doc. 8), and, accordingly, on July 22, 2002, the complaint was unsealed and subsequently served on the defendants. On August 22, 2002 the court ordered/allowed Stronstorff to file an amended complaint under seal by Sept. 23rd. On 9/9/02 Relator moved for an extension of time for the filing of an amended complaint under seal [Doc 24], which was granted, yet the "under seal" was missing in the order [Doc 25].

On 9/20/02 IHS filed a suggestion of bankruptcy [Doc 13] and the Court ordered administrative closure on 9/26/02. Blake Medical Center moved to dismiss the complaint and Motion to stay on September 27, 2002 (Doc. 15, 16). On October 8th, 2002 plaintiff responded to them [Doc 17] and filed documents to show that claims had been reported paid [Doc 18]. Blake's Motion for Clarification [DOC 19] was granted on October 22, 2002 with an order to unseal the entire file [Doc 20]. This clarification was to the 9/26/02 order [Doc 14] , which closed the case administratively due to IHS' suggestion of bankruptcy [Doc 13].

On October 22nd the Court ordered the entire case unsealed, so that the first amended complaint under seal [Doc 26], which added parties, was unsealed immediately, when it arrived in Court This order [Doc 20] overlapped the filing of the "first amended complaint under seal" [DOC. 26], which had been granted by the Court by documents 23 and 25 on August 22nd and September 13th respectively.

The next possibly "enigmatic" motions by Relator [documents 27 - clarification of AHCA issue , 28 - documents to support the claim, 29 - motion for reconsideration of "under seal issue", 31 clarification of IHS stay as to legal obligations]. Stronstorff was unaware of Local Rule 3.01(a), which would have made such motions possibly unnecessary. After receiving this notification, she attempted to comply. These motions were all made with the belief that part of the case should remain under seal [Document 25 shows that on 9/13/02 an extension of time to file an amended complaint under seal was given, although, on 8/15/02 summons had been issued and on 8/29/02 a " first amended complaint " not under seal had been filed. [This first amended complaint used Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) to merely correct certain errors and added events, which were already known to the United States, yet updated the complaint. [Document 11 on 7/22/02 ordered that the complaint should be served and relator did so].

The amended complaint "to be filed under seal" is found as Doc 26. [The case was dismissed before any action was taken other than a notice of Joinder by Premier Internal Medicine [Doc 41]]. New evidence and parties were added. According to the directives of the United States, it should remain under seal for 60 days before serving. [fn3] Consequently, it was not served according to directives and not in error. On 11/18/02 Appellant filed a Motion to deny Blake a discovery stay [DOC. 33]. On 11/29/02 Blake filed a response and on 12/13/02 Stronstorff filed an unauthorized reply, which possibly could have been interpreted as a motion to strike [DOC 35]. On December 20,2002 Defendant Blake Medical Center filed a motion to strike [DOC 36] to which Stronstorff responded on January 6, 2003. On February 7th summons were issued for the added parties in document 26. On February 13th, 2003 the Court granted BMC's motion to dismiss without prejudice pursuant Local Rule 2.01(a) pending reopening of the case by an attorney by March 11th, 2003. There followed attempts to have the case reopened past the deadlines set by the court [Motion for an extension of time on March 11, 2003 [granted] and a Motion for reconsideration on April 1st, 2003 [denied]. The latter was denied on 4/14/03 [Doc 45] and effectively terminated her litigation with finality upon which this appeal was filed. A notice of appeal was filed on April 28, 2003.

The case has been closed since February 13th, 2003. The possibility of reopening the case ended on April 14th, 2003 with the district court denial of Relator's Motion for Reconsideration of the issue of self representation.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This is an appeal about the Constitutional right to equality before the law and procedural due process. The Court abused it's discretion by making representation through counsel imperative for continued litigation and dismissing Relator's case. Self representation "under 28 U.S.C. § 1654 is an unqualified right, which is fundamental to our system of democracy and too important to be deferred until the entire case is concluded, citing O'Reilly v. New York Times, 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2nd Cir. 1982)." See RESHARD v. BRITT, 819 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1987).

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. A due process claim is cognizable in that relator has the right to a percentage of the recovery of a False Claims Act action and it is her claim, because the government declined to step in on February 19, 2002. She is aware of violations of government contracts and policies, but has been denied discovery to finalize her claim [Doc 17 and Doc 33]. Factual allegations of her complaint must be taken as true, and any ambiguities or doubts concerning the sufficiency of the claim must be resolved in favor of the pleader.

To dismiss an FCA action, because of the difficulty in obtaining a lawyer in an FCA action is unfair to the meaning of the laws [Doc 17 - pg 10].

The dismissal as found in Documents 40, 43 and 45 would apply for every party, since all are part of the FCA claim, which according to the district court will not go forward since there was no lawyer, who moved to reopen the FCA case by April 1, 2003. Axiomatically, one cannot grant dismissal for lack of counsel to one party and not to the others.

Self representation is conclusively a different issue from the FCA complaint and is entitled to immediate review by the Appeals court under the collateral doctrine. See RESHARD v. BRITT, 819 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1987).

The Supreme court has determined Vermont Agency of Nat. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765(2000) that when the government declines to intervene, the case becomes Relator's own and consequently Stronstorff should be allowed to proceed with her case to judgment on merits.

28 U.S.C. § 1654 allows that "in all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally..." and 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) allows relator to proceed with the action, when the U.S. declines to intervene.

No discovery has been allowed against Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 and 26. In fact, the required disclosure statement for corporations was never submitted to the Relator in the district court action until this appeal. Discovery must be allowed.

Stronstorff became the real party in interest when the United States declined to intervene. She cannot harm the interests of the United states, since she alone takes on the litigation. By continuing pro se, the U.S. has a chance of recovery. Without her, they have already lost. Consequently, her "poor representation" might burden the court, yet does not harm the interests of the United States.

Stronstorff would be subject to sanctions and dismissal during prosecution. She is entitled to a judgment other than only dismissal on questionable use of only Local Rule 2.01(a) without judgment on the substantive matters of fraud raised in her complaint.

ARGUMENT /CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY

I. THE COURT ERRED BY MAKING A LAWYER NECESSARY FOR CONTINUATION OF THE FCA CASE ,WHEN THE UNITED STATES

HAD DECLINED TO INTERVENE.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1654 everyone has an unqualified democratic right to self-representation. The issue appealed is too important to be deferred until the entire case is concluded. See O'Reilly v. New York Times, 692 F.2d 863 (2nd Cir. 1982) and RESHARD v. BRITT, 819 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1987).

In Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 411 (2 Cir. 1976) it was stated that it is a

"long established principle that in the federal courts the parties have the right to plead and conduct their own cases . . . ."

Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." Stronstorff became the real party in interest, when the United States declined to intervene.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, stated that the right of a party to bring an action in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1654 is the "basic right of free people" and the trial court was in error in requiring that they obtain outside counsel in order to proceed.

Furthermore the orders forbidding Relator to proceed pro se prevent the merits of the case from being considered. BMC's motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) was not mentioned by the district court. Here the court would have to take as true the allegations of the complaint and construe them in favor of the plaintiffs. Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1486 (11 Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987 (1993), Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Federal courts must accept as true the allegations in the complaint as true. (See, e.g., Gardener v. Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U.S. 167, 172 (1967).

The court also avoids all mention of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), another ground given by BMC for dismissal. The substance of the complaint remains unaddressed with the defacto dismissal by not allowing Stronstorff to proceed pro se in the absence of a lawyer.

The court seems to have erred in closing the case citing only Local Rule 2.01(a), since the Federal Claims Act clearly states that when the United States declines to participate, the action becomes Relator's own action. The Supreme Court decision Vermont Agency of Nat. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765(2000) makes this clear. The Court avoided all mention of United States cx. rel. Trice v. Westinghouse Hansford Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8838(E.D. ash.Mar. 2000), 30

United States ex rel. Kelly v. The Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 748 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140, 127 L. Ed. 2d 433, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994) held that qui tam plaintiffs have Article III standing:

" In sum, the Ninth Circuit held "Congress intended to assign the government's fraud claims to individual qui tam plaintiffs in cases where the government itself chooses not to pursue such claims."

Judge Wm. Fremming Nielsen in Trice , id. used Kelly and held that:

"[C]ase law and statutes prohibit a corporation's claims from being pursued by a pro se individual. No such bar exists for the Government's claims." at Trice, id., 33.

The issue of pro se representation in this dismissed FCA case requires de novo review, since the decision to deny Stronstorff self-representation appears contrary to current law.

The Court appears biased in not citing Petitioner's case argumentation against dismissal of her complaint as found in Document 17. By ignoring her argumentation completely, it seems that a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" : the hallmark of procedural due process, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was not given.

Arguments for discovery in the same document [Doc 17] and again belatedly in Document 33 were totally ignored hampering her due process right to discovery.

Furthermore, by continuing the case without the intervention of the United States, Relator knowingly accepts the risks that if the defendant prevails against her, she will have to pay reasonable fees and expenses if the Court would find her action as clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of harassment. [31 U.S.C. §3730(d)(4)]. With this personal risk, it should underscore that the allegations are true. The defendants have had ample opportunity to explain why the complaint is invalid and have not used it to date. Defendants have avoided all discovery attempts to date.

Michael A. Hirst wrote an informative Overview of The False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 in which the liability of the defendants for civil damages and penalties seems certain. [fn1] There are numerous qui tam case types, which seem to apply to her case. [fn2]

It is not understood how the court might be able to disregard the Supreme Court Vermont Agency of Nat. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765(2000)

In addition to ignoring the laws cited, the time limit set by the court appears arbitrary. It is difficult to find specialized lawyers, who have not already represented the corporations involved. Qui tam litigation is extremely specialized. There are few lawyers. Of these, conflict of interest because of the extensive parties involved, narrow the availability of an experienced law firm to take over and litigate the case. Relator did not just sit around and wait for the deadline for obtaining counsel to arrive as portrayed by BMC in Document 46 in points 3 and 4 and in the Response to this Court requested parties' position on the jurisdictional question.

The complaint is a serious matter in the area of health care. To dismiss this case before the statute of limitations ends all litigation possibilities, is to allow alleged crimes against the United States and its citizens and visitors to continue without any consequences. This is not the purpose of the FCA. This would be a miscarriage of justice. This decision should be reviewed de novo and remanded with instructions to allow extended discovery to finalize all claims. This appeal has brought the very first disclosure of the corporation involvement with BMC's jurisdictional question Response to this Court - seven different corporations for one entity.

III. THE UNUSUAL PROCEDURES COMPLICATED

RELATOR'S PRESENTATIONS AND PREJUDICED HER CASE

The court appeared to err in ordering the entire file unsealed [Doc 20], since Relator had filed a response [Doc 22 , 24] and an amended complaint under seal was pending. This possibly harmless error did cause problems for the Pro se relator as seen in document 29 and 32, since she believed the private contractual issues were free from public view for 60 days. The Doc 25 order of 09/13/02 allowed for an amended complaint [request under seal -Doc 24 [s-14 of 9/9/02] after the Doc 12 amended complaint, which was served on the original parties [BMC and IHS].

She naively believed that the court would not make mistakes of procedure, which would be corrected by defendant's counsel [Doc 19]. She did not follow all Local Rules in procedural matters. She exceeded the 30 page length by 4 pages. [Her only prior court experience allowed 50]. She did and does not know all motion practice, yet is capable of learning fast. These technicalities are not supposed to hinder the prosecution of a claim unless no allegation or cause of action can be substantiated.

When the government declined to intervene, the relator proceeded with the action [31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3)]. The government asked to be served with all pleadings. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) demands that an amended complaint with "any new allegations of fraud or the addition of defendants not named in the complaint would initiate a new sixty-day seal period ."

The Court's order [Doc 32], which admonished Relator's Doc 29 as simply her private contractual problem seemed to miss the problem , which introduction of the element "Hurley" and Bradenton Emergency Medicine presented:

"The purpose of the seal in a qui tam action is to avoid tipping off the defendant during the United States' investigatory period, especially where there may be a related criminal investigation. See S. Rep. No. 345, at 24, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2(1986), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News. 5266, 5289."

This was a new allegation of fraud and added new parties and this required it to remain under seal. Local Rule 3.01(a) was new to Relator at this time. From her entire adult stay in Europe, the Judges knew the regulations and decided on the issues themselves, since the law is usually clear.

Discovery Procedures were not followed as required. Relator was unaware that she must answer, the motion for stay [Doc 16] believing that her complaint could not be dismissed without a chance to amend since both Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)

and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) objections found in BMC's Motion to Dismiss 35

[Doc 15] could be disproved or be corrected. The Discovery problems were already addressed in Doc 17. Document 35, which BMC moved to strike illustrated the extreme problems with the corporate entity Blake Medical Center to allow discovery. Local Rule 3.05 pertaining to Case management was thwarted constantly by BMC's counsel. Document 33 asks outright for the lift of discovery stay, detailing the problems encountered with the corporation in earlier court cases for over two years.

Fairness is expected, when presenting cases by the parties and certainly by the court. The Court's orders dismissing the case do not cite one case, which would support the pro se party [although these were repeatedly pointed out to him in Doc 15 - Pg 18, Doc 17 - Pg 9-10, Doc 35-10, Doc 42 - Pg 1 and Doc 44 -Pg 4-7. It appears, because Stronstorff inadvertently mentioned two procedural errors - falsely closing the entire case [Doc 14] and falsely unsealing the entire case [Doc 20], that she should be replaced with a professional counsel, who is more

The importance of Discovery was mentioned in her Doc 33 asking for the denial of BMC's discovery motion. This document was never mentioned by the court. Discovery had already been asked for in her response to BMC's motion to dismiss [Doc 17 - Pg 2-3, Pg 35, Doc 35 -Pg 5-9, 12, 15 ].

Relator requests de novo review to remand with instructions to vacate or alter the order dismissing her case and to assure fairness and allow all discovery procedures to finalize or dismiss her claims.

Based on the foregoing and any additional information, facts or law, which may be presented in Appellant's Reply Brief and at Oral Hearing, if so requested and granted, APPELLANT/PETITIONER CAROL STRONSTORFF respectfully requests that this Court remand the case with instructions to either vacate or amend the appealed Orders, which ended Relator's litigating possibilities and direct the Court to allow Relator to pursue the action to trial or judgment without counsel if necessary and to be permitted to conduct discovery upon the factual issues pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16 and Rule 26 and the discovery practice manual of this Court (MIDDLE DISTRICT DISCOVERY (2001) at I.E.4) to finalize her claims.

Dismissal in this manner is both unfair and would cause irreparable damage to Stronstorff's complaints and deserves immediate review. The case as it stands now, will not achieve a summary or final judgment.

This is reversible error and it is prayed that the Appeals court will reverse and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with democratic justice in the interest of improving the quality and affordability of health care in the United States.

[fn1] Michael A. Hirst, Assistant United States Attorney and Chief of Affirmative Civil Litigation in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of California Spring 2000 The False Claims Act and Qui Tam Provisions in BizLaw J. 3 (2001 http://bizlawjournal.ucdavis.edu/articles/hirst.htm.

Mischarging - false claim for products or services that were not delivered or rendered.

Product and service substitution - certifying healthcare services that were not provided

False negotiation or defective pricing - submitting false pricing and cost data to the government, which results in an inflated contract price.

False certification of entitlement for benefits.

[fn3] February 19, 2002 letter from the U.S. Department of Justice, Tampa signed by Latour Lafferty

[fn4] J.B. STRINGFELLOW, JR., ET AL., PETITIONERS V. CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION, ET AL. No. 85-184 In The Supreme Court Of The United States October Term, 1986 On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit Brief For The United States As Respondent Supporting Petitioners

REFERENCE TO PARTIES

Pursuant FRAP 28(d) the following references to parties are made:

Appellant/ Relator Carol Stronstorff will be referred to as Stronstorff or Relator.

Appellee/Defendant Blake Medical Center will be referred to as Blake or BMC.

Appellee/Defendant Integrated Health Services of Bradenton will be referred to as IHS.

REFERENCES TO RECORDS

Pursuant 11th Cir. R. 28-4 there are no volume numbers so that all references are to the original docket document number with the abbreviation Doc followed by the document number and page [Doc 1 - Pg 1].

Respectfully submitted,

Carol Stronstorff, pro se

Fax: 775-257-6489 June 5, 2003

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing INITIAL BRIEF ON THE MERITS OF APPELLANT CAROL STRONSTORFF has been furnished to

on this 9th day of June 2003.

Carol Stronstorff, pro se